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ADULT RIGHTS AS THE ACHILLES' 
HEEL OF THE
BEST INTERESTS STANDARD: LESSONS 
IN FAMILY
LAW FROM ACROSS THE POND
Margaret Ryznar*
And the king said, "Bring me a sword." So 
a sword was brought
before the king. And the king said, "Divide 
the living child in two,
and give half to the one and half to the 
other." Then the woman
whose son was alive said to the king, because 
her heart yearned for
her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the living 
child, and by no means
put him to death." But the other said, "He 
shall be neither mine
nor yours; divide him." Then the king answered 
and said, "Give the
living child to the first woman, and by no 
means put him to death;
she is his mother."
- 1 Kings 3:24-27
INTRODUCTION
Although reverence for King Solomon's 
wisdom is hardly ill-
placed, his celebrated case of identifying a 
child's mother was admit-
tedly simpler than those facing family law judges today.
1 There were
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; 
M.A. European
Studies, Jagiellonian University, 2005; B.A. 
Economics, English Language and
Literature, Political Science, and Law, Letters, 
& Society, University of Chicago, 2004.
To Mom, Dad, and Elizabeth for the perfect 
childhood, filled with deliriously happy
trips to the park; as well as to Matthew R. 
Hays and family for keeping my best
interests at heart. I am indebted to Professors 
Barbara Fick and]. Eric Smithburn for
their help with this Note, in addition to all 
of the professors whose classes have
revolutionized my thinking. Last but certainly 
not least, thanks are due to Susan Turk
and my colleagues at the Notre Dame Law Review, 
in addition to heartfelt apologies
for a pesky dependence on international citations-every 
editor's worst nightmare.
1 For an astonishingly convoluted family law 
case, see A v. C, [1985] 6 Fam. L.R.
445, wherein a father sought access to a child born 
of a nineteen-year-old prostitute
artificially inseminated with his sperm in a contract 
for the sale of a baby. After the
child's conception, the father married his 
older, barren girlfriend with whom he
cohabitated, content that he had a biological baby 
of his own. Id. at 447. The court
sacked his plan, depriving him of custody after 
the prostitute decided to keep the
baby. Id. at 453; see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 
1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (a woman
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no grandparents or same-sex partners demanding shared custody.2
No frozen embryos, eugenic sperm banks, or surrogate mothers await-
ing judicial deliberation. But most conveniently, King Solomon did
not labor under fierce cries of "due process!" or "equal protection!"
Such sentiments, part of a growing clamor for parental and adult
rights, provide much of the confusion and contradiction in family law
jurisprudence today.3
Family law litigants have long searched for permutations of con-
stitutional principles that gain access to federal courts and vindicate
supposed constitutional rights in state family law cases. 4 In the pro-
cess, even the venerable "best interests of the child" standard has been
compromised, a standard under which judges can weigh competing
claims in child-related cases by weighing the child's interests most
heavily.5 Such cases pitting children's interests against those of adults
have been resolved relatively easily by federal courts in the United
States to date, but more complicated cases may ensue if the introduc-
tion of family law cases to federal dockets continues accelerating.6
One legal system currently wrestling with this familiar clash
between the rights of children and adults is that of England, which
shares the United States' deeply embedded commitment to the child's
changed her mind after having agreed, under a surrogacy contract, to be artificially
inseminated with a man's sperm and to surrender the baby to him and his wife).
2 The family unit in King Solomon's time is no longer typical. See, e.g., Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family."); Develop-
ments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1996, 2001 (2003)
[hereinafter Developments] ("The 'nuclear family'-still the archetype in American law
and politics-for the first time describes less than one-quarter of all U.S.
households.").
3 When speaking of adult rights, this Note refers to both parental and
nonparental rights regarding children.
4 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The integrity of the fam-
ily unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment." (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
5 For a useful background on the American best interests standard, seeJohn C.
Lore 111, Protecting Abused, Neglected, and Abandoned Children: A Proposal for Provisional
Out-of-State Kinship Placements Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chil-
dren, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 64 n.23 (2006).
6 Thus far, the Supreme Court has carefully selected its family law cases. See, e.g.,
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("The intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our
society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they
are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases." (emphasis
added)).
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best interests. This common value has hardly slowed parents on
either side of the ocean from arguing that their rights should take
priority over the court-construed best interests of their children. In
England, the discord between the rights of parents and those of chil-
dren has been aggravated by the recent passage of conflicting legisla-
tion-parents are now armed with the rights granted by the Human
Rights Act of 1998,7 while children's interests are given preference in
an earlier act, the Children Act of 1989.8
England's strategy in dealing with this conflict has visible advan-
tages and disadvantages, but more importantly, offers lessons to the
United States that are examined in this Note. Part I considers the
constitutional rights for American adults that implicate the best inter-
ests standard, particularly under due process and equal protection
arguments. Part II explores the same conflict between adults' rights
and children's best interests under recent English legislation incorpo-
rating the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, Part III
exacts lessons for the United States from England's similarly posi-
tioned situation. It concludes that American federal courts should be
more hesitant to federalize family law as it relates to children if the
best interests standard is to be preserved and argues that the standard
is more effective in protecting children's interests than the
Constitution.
I. THE ENCROACHMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON
THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD
The Federal Constitution not only fuels the federalization of fam-
ily law, but also serves as a fertility statue for conflict between the best
interests standard and the rights potentially afforded to adults. The
occasional Supreme Court stints in state family law issues have raised
many eyebrows,9 yet the Supreme Court defended its interference in
Lehr v. Robertson 0 :
In some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal
Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protec-
tion for certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the
state cases, the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the
7 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
8 Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1 (Eng.).
9 See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 361-69 (2002); Eric S. Lind, Note, Interstate Collection of Child
Support and Federalism: Mhy the States Have Authority and What They Need to Do to Keep it,
11 BYUJ. PuB. L. 103, 108-09 (1997).
10 463 U.S. 248.
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welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are
a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.
1
This expansion of parental rights under the 
Constitution is one
step in what some scholars have labeled the federalization, 
or constitu-
tionalization, of family law.) 2 But what of the best interests standard
governing family law cases at the state level? Interestingly 
enough, the
Supreme Court, in affirming adults' constitutional 
rights, relied on
the presumption that the best interests of the 
child will inherently be
guarded by parental responsibility to their 
children.' 3 However, this
presumption, often applied by courts toiling to protect 
a parent's lib-
erty interest under the Due Process Clause, fails 
to address the doubt-
lessly recognizable scenario wherein adults' 
interests do not correlate
with their children's best interests. This 
reality prompted the
Supreme Court to restrict the best interests 
standard to custody and
visitation proceedings, admitting that in other 
cases, the interests of
adults may trump the interests of the child 
so long as minimum child
11 Id. at 257.
12 For an insightful article on this phenomenon, 
see Jerome A. Barron, The Con-
stitutionalization of American Family Law: The Case of the Right 
to Many, in CRoss CUR-
RENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND ENGLAND 257, 257-68
(Stanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter CROSS CURRENTS].
13 See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257. American 
family law operates on several pre-
sumptions that have been debated by academics. 
See Helen M. Alvari, The Case for
Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children sRights 
Perspective, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 3 (2003). Compare Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring 
with Wardle: Morality,
Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 
U. ILL. L. R~v. 253, 271-79 (taking
issue with Professor Wardle's suggestion that 
courts should adopt a rebuttable pre-
sumption that awarding parental rights to a person 
engaging in ongoing homosexual
relations is not in the best interests of the child), with Lynn 
D. Wardle, Fighting with
Phantoms: A Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 629, 637-40 (responding
to the criticisms of adopting a rebuttable 
presumption regarding homosexual parents
by arguing that his critics mischaracterized 
his position and that their criticism was
not based on his arguments, but on preconceived 
notions). But seeJohn Eekelaar, Are
Parents Morally Obliged to Care for Their Children?, 11 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 340,
351-53 (1991) (suggesting that parents may not owe 
a moral duty to their children in
ethical theory).
English family law is also riddled with presumptions, 
but some English judges
have been shying away from their use. See, 
e.g., Payne v. Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ)
166, [2001] Fain. 473, [25] ("1 was using the word 
presumption in the non-legal
sense. But with the advantage of hindsight 
I regret the use of that word. Generally in
the language of litigation a presumption 
either casts a burden of proof upon the party
challenging it or can be said to be decisive 
of outcome unless displaced. I do not
think that such concepts of presumption 
and burden of proof have any place in Chil-
dren Act 1989 litigation where the judge exercises a 
function that is partly inquisito-
rial."). The presumption to which Lord Thorpe was 
referring favored the custodial
parent as protecting the best interests of 
the child.
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care requirements are met.
14 Even in this limited subset of child-
related cases, however, adults' interests do not always 
suit those of
their children, particularly if due process or 
equal protection argu-
ments are used to counter the best 
interests standard) 5
A. Due Process Arguments
Adult parties to a family law case frequently raise 
due process
claims in federal court. Due process arguments 
not only make federal
courts accessible to parties bringing state family 
law issues, but also
provide one of the few claims legally sufficient 
to offset the potent best
interests standard.'
6
Litigants have raised both procedural and substantive 
due pro-
cess claims as challenges to lower courts' findings 
of a child's best
interests.17 Substantive due process claims are 
more crippling to chil-
14 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) ("'The best 
interests of the child,'
a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, 
is a proper and feasible crite-
rion for making the decision as to which of two 
parents will be accorded custody. But
it is not traditionally the sole criterion-much 
less the sole constitutional criterion-
for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving 
children, where their interests
conflict in varying degrees with the interests 
of others."); id. at 304 ("So long as cer-
tain minimum requirements of child care 
are met, the interests of the child may be
subordinated to the interests of other children, 
or indeed even to the interests of the
parents or guardians themselves."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978);
R.C.N. v. State, 233 S.E.2d 866, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1977) (holding that a mother's
poverty and unstable living arrangement 
were insufficient to terminate her parental
rights).
15 For an interesting examination of 
due process and equal protection in the
context of the child-parent relationship, 
see Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Parenthood in 
the
United States, in CROSS CURRENTS, supra note 
12, at 187, 190-92.
In addition to the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, the Constitution is
ripe with grounds for overruling a child's 
best interests if a court were to prioritize 
an
adult's rights instead. One can easily imagine 
First Amendment challenges to custody
based on differences of religious beliefs 
within fragmented families. See generally 
Kelsi
Brown Corkran, Comment, Free Exercise 
in Foster Care: Defining the Scope of Religious
Rights for Foster Children and Their Families, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 325, 344-53 (2005) (argu-
ing that although courts have yet to decide 
a case involving a conflict between a bio-
logical parent and child on the issue of 
religion, this area is ripe for conflict in 
cases
involving foster families, which inherently 
necessitates state action). Nonetheless, the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
in the Fourteenth Amendment have
caused the most interference with the child's 
best interests standard to date.
16 If the parties fail to raise a due process 
argument, the Supreme Court can raise
it sua sponte. See Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 660 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
17 Compare Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 753 (1982) ("'[S]tate intervention
to terminate [a parental] relationship. . .must 
be accomplished by procedures meet-
ing the requisites of the Due Process 
Clause.'" (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
1653
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dren because they create parental rights that are enforceable in fed-
eral court even if those rights conflict with the best interests of a child.
Procedural due process claims are more neutral to children's interests
because they simply allow courts to hear arguments from both parties
and decide the case under the best interests standard.
A recent example of a splendid clash between a parent's substan-
tive due process rights and the best interests standard occurred in
Troxel v. Granville.18 The Washington statute disputed in Troxel read:
"'Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may
order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the
best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances. "'19 Under the statute, a set of grandparents attempted
to obtain visitation rights with their grandchildren after the mother
curtailed visitation. Prior to the mother's interference, the grandpar-
ents were regularly visited by the children before their son-the
father of the children-committed suicide.20
The Superior Court found that visitation was in the children's
best interests, 21 while the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that nonparents lacked standing to seek visitation under the statute
unless a custody action was pending.22 The Washington Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in denying the grandparents' vis-
itation rights, but on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional
because it interfered with the fundamental right of parents to rear
their children.23
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981))), and Stanley, 405 U.S. at 660 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court holds sua sponte that the Due Process Clause requires that Stanley, the
unwed biological father, be accorded a hearing as to his fitness as a parent before his
children are declared wards of the state court... ."), with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("[Wle held that the 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right of parents to 'establish a home and bring up chil-
dren' and 'to control the education of their own.'" (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923))).
18 530 U.S. 57.
19 Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)
(1994)).
20 Id. at 60.
21 Id. at 61; see also id. at 62 ("The court took into consideration all factors regard-
ing the best interest of the children and considered all the testimony before it. The
children would be benefitted (sic] from spending quality time with the Petitioners,
provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens' (sic] nuclear family."
(second alteration in original)).
22 In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); see also In re Wolcott, 933
P.2d 1066, 1069 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
23 In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998).
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Although the Washington Supreme Court struck down 
the stat-
ute because it was facially unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court
granted certiorari and validated, at length, the mother's 
due process
claim.24 The Court opined: "In light of. . . extensive 
precedent, it
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause 
of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the fundamental right 
of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their
children."25
The precedent invoked by the Troxel Court permitted 
parents
broad authority over their children under the "liberty" 
principle of
the Due Process Clause, including the right to make 
decisions con-
cerning the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of their
children.26 As the Court reasoned, "More than 75 
years ago, in Meyer
v. Nebraska, we held that the 'liberty' protected 
by the Due Process
Clause includes the right of parents to 'establish a home 
and bring up
children' and 'to control the education of their own."
27 Thus, when
parental rights are at stake in judicial cases, the court must accord 
the
parent due process while pursuing the state interest 
of protecting the
best interests of the child. Generally, the presumption 
that fit parents
act in their children's best interests suffices to protect 
a parent's lib-
erty interests in raising children.
28
The plurality opinion in Troxel, however, glossed 
over the ques-
tion of the best interests of the child.
29 Justice O'Connor, underscor-
ing the presumption that fit parents generally act 
in their children's
best interests, opined that a fit parent's decision of 
whom to give visita-
tion rights is in the best interests of the children 
unless the parent is
24 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. "In response to Tommie 
Granville's federal constitu-
tional challenge, the State Supreme Court broadly 
held that. . . [the statute] was
invalid on its face under the Federal Constitution. 
Despite the nature of this judg-
ment, Justice O'Connor would hold that the Washington 
visitation statute violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
only as applied." Id. at 81 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 66 (plurality opinion).
26 Id. at 65-68. But see Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-30 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (noting that the liberty aspect of due 
process does not protect a
father's parental rights to his biological 
child when that child was born into a
woman's existing marriage to another person).
27 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923)).
28 Developments, supra note 2, at 2054.
29 But cf id. at 2055-58 (arguing that Troxel implicitly 
endorsed the state-wide
trend of renewed dedication to the best interests 
of the child standard by only broadly
supporting the presumption that parents 
act in the best interests of their children).
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proven unfit.30 Any infringement upon this parental decision violates
due process.3' In fact, Justice O'Connor concluded that Troxel was
simply about the conflict between the state and the parent in regards
to the child's best interests: "[T]his case involves nothing more than a
simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and
Granville concerning her children's best interests. 3 2
However, TroxeCs adverse impact on the child's best interests
standard is more pronounced than the plurality opinion admits, cata-
lyzing dissenting opinions from several Justices. First, the presump-
tion that fit parents always act in their children's best interests can
hardly characterize all litigating parents, particularly in tense divorce
proceedings that pit the father against the mother. Second, the Wash-
ington statute simply granted a third party the procedural right to
seek visitation with a child, allowing the court to weigh the circum-
stances under the best interests of the child standard.3 3 Nonetheless,
it was stricken, prohibiting courts from using the standard in permit-
ting third parties to visit children over parental objections, even when
it was in the children's best interests. Most importantly, by finding the
statute unconstitutional, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
best interests standard in third-party visitation cases.3 4
30 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; see supra note 13.
31 Justice O'Connor also suggested that the mother did not want to wholly restrict
the grandparents' visitation: "Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville
ever sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the present dispute originated when
Granville informed the Troxels that she would prefer to restrict their visitation with
Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special holidays." Troxel, 530
U.S. at 71. Although this may be factually true in Granville's case, it is not difficult to
imagine that giving a mother complete discretion in regards to third party visitation
rights may result in the complete termination of those visitation rights.
32 Id. at 72.
33 See id. at 90-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Far from guaranteeing that parents'
interests will be trammeled in the sweep of cases arising under the statute, the Wash-
ington law merely gives an individual-with whom a child may have an established
relationship-the procedural right to ask the State to act as arbiter, through the
entirely well-known best-interests standard, between the parents' protected interests
and the child's.").
34 By finding the statute unconstitutional, Troxel undermined the best interests
standard in all fifty states. See id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, contempo-
rary practice should give us some pause before rejecting the best interests of the child
standard in all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington court has done. The
standard has been recognized for many years as a basic tool of domestic relations law
in visitation proceedings. Since 1965, all 50 States have enacted a third-party visita-
tion statute of some sort.... Each of these statutes, save one, permits a court order to
issue in certain cases if visitation is found to be in the best interests of the child.").
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Thus, although much scholarly attention regarding Troxel has
focused on the denial of grandparents' rights, this case also prioritized
the mother's due process rights over the best interests of her child in
the context of third-party visitation. 5 The result caused Justice Scalia
concern regarding the federalization of family law:
I think it obvious . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of
judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law. I have no
reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this than state
legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantages of
doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct
their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.3 6
Justice Souter also cautioned in his concurrence that Troxel did not
necessitate "turning any fresh furrows in the 'treacherous field' of sub-
stantive due process. 5 7
Although due process has thus interfered with the child's best
interests standard, the equal protection clause has also tipped several
family law cases onto the Supreme Court's docket, to which this Note
turns next.
B. Equal Protection Claims
Equal protection is another popular constitutional claim used by
family law litigants in federal courts. Although winning a family law
case on an equal protection argument may be difficult,38 success is not
35 States rebelled against this decision. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying
text.
36 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 76 (SouterJ., concurring) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
502 (1977)); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (WhiteJ, dissenting) ("That the Court has
ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should not lead it to
repeat the process at will.").
38 The Supreme Court has allowed the rights among family members to differ,
but only if such distinctions "serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Compare id.
at 391 (holding that equal protection was violated by the New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law provision that allowed an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father,
to block her child's adoption because the sex-based discrimination advanced no
important state interest), with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) ("If
one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal
rights."), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("The Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the State may constitutionally distin-
guish between unwed fathers and unwed mothers. Here, Illinois' different treatment
2007] 1657
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rare enough to discourage litigators from invoking it. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause, for example, was successfully used to override a lower
court's determination of a child's best interests in Palmore v. Sidoti,39
wherein the Supreme Court prioritized the Fourteenth Amendment
and society's interest in not tolerating racism. 40
In Palmore, the lower court determined that keeping a three-year-
old in the custody of her Caucasian mother, who had cohabitated with
an African American before marrying him, was not in the child's best
interests. 4 1 The court therefore granted the child's biological father
full custody, placing part of its judgment on the cohabitation factor:
It is of some significance, however, that the mother did see fit to
bring a man into her home and carry on a sexual relationship with
him without being married to him. Such action tended to place
gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's
future welfare. 42
of the two is part of that State's statutory scheme for protecting the welfare of illegiti-
mate children.").
English courts determine parentage and the legal rights afforded to parents by
virtue of the definitions embodied in certain legislation. When denying fatherhood
to a woman's ex-partner, although during their relationship she was implanted with
an embryo composed of another man's sperm so that they could raise a child within
the relationship together, the Appeal Court explained, "We agree that the term 'par-
ent' includes a person who is to be treated as a parent by virtue of section 27 or 28 of
the [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990." In re R (A Child) (IVF: Pater-
nity of Child), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 182, [2003] Fain. 129, [31]. However, the court
was quick to mention the Children Act of 1989, "Of course, findings of parentage can
be made in the course of other proceedings, for example under section 4 of the
Children Act 1989." Id. at [33]. In this particular case, however, the court conceded
that the best interests of the resulting daughter may require visitation from the ex-
partner despite his lack of parental legal status. A court order is pending while the
former couple attempts to come to a voluntary agreement regarding visitation. Id. at
[35].
39 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
40 Id. at 433. But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978) (holding
that the adoption of a child by the stepfather according to the best interest of the
child standard did not violate the biological father's due process rights, when he
made no effort to legitimize the child). For an examination of the issue of race and
adoption in English law, see Michael Freeman, Disputing Children, in CROSS CURRENTS,
supra note 12, at 441, 467-68.
41 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431.
42 Id. English courts also use a mother's sexual gratification as evidence that she
does not prioritize a child's best interests. See, e.g., In re KD. (A Minor) (Ward: Ter-
mination of Access), [1988] A.C. 806, 814 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[The
mother] was, however, very immature and there were a number of occasions upon
which she allowed her interest in going out and meeting boyfriends to take priority
over the interests of her child. She formed an association with a rather unsatisfactory
young man and in June 1983 became pregnant again.").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, returning
the child to the full custody of the mother and stepfather, over the
biological father's objections. Admitting that child custody cases raise
state issues, the Court emphasized the best interests standard, "The
goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is
indisputably a substantial government interest for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause."43 Ultimately, however, the Court held that
the lower court's judgment regarding the best interests of the child
catered to private prejudices and interfered with the Equal Protection
Clause.44 By doing so, the Court prioritized the principle of equal
protection over the lower court's determination of the best interests
of the child, noting that the child may suffer negative consequences as
a result.
Although Palmore rests on particularly sensitive facts that dramati-
cally invoke an equal protection claim,45 the constitutional argument
makes less controversial but equally successful appearances in cases
involving the changing roles and rights of men and women in family
law today.46 Thus, the rise of both equal protection and due process
arguments has provocatively challenged the place of the best interests
standard in American family law.
II. THE CLASH BETWEEN ADULTS' AND CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS IN ENGLAND
The same conflict between adults' rights and children's best
interests surfaced most recently-and most powerfully-across the
pond in England. The problem has continued to intensify there and
teeters on irreconcilability unless the English courts can reach a satis-
factory resolution. Given that this conflict is immortalized in contra-
dictory English legislation, a solution is hardly simple.
43 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
44 Id.
45 The presence of race in Palmore has not affected the precedential value of the
case, which has been invoked by several subsequent litigants. See, e.g., Marlow v. Mar-
low, 702 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Unsurprisingly, however, state courts
have declined invitations by litigants to expand Palmore's scope, instead prioritizing
the best interests standard. See, e.g., Phelps v. Phelps, 446 S.E.2d 17, 22 (N.C. 1994);
Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 123 (S.D. 1996).
46 See supra note 38.
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A. The Statutory Basis for Conflict
1. The Children Act of 198947
Although English law regarding children is steeped in common
law, 48 this Note will focus on children's rights following the legislative
recognition of such rights in the Children Act of 1989. The 1989 Act
has been held to be "the most comprehensive piece of legislation
which Parliament has ever enacted about children."49 The Act
reformed substantive law, procedures, the duties of government agen-
cies, the responsibilities of parents, and the structure and authority of
the courts that deal with children.50
The subject of this Note, and the equivalent of the American best
interests standard, is the welfare principle embedded in section 1 of
the Children Act of 1989: "When a court determines any question
with respect to (a) the upbringing of a child; or (b) the administra-
tion of a child's property or the application of any income arising
from it, the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount considera-
tion."51 Section 1 also provides several other general principles for
courts to use in child-related cases:
[1.] the courts shall have regard to the general principle that any
delay in determining questions with respect to the child's upbring-
ing is likely to prejudice the child's welfare;
[2.] the courts shall have regard to certain specific matters when
applying the welfare principle in contested 'family proceedings'
(defined by § 8(3) of the Act); and
[3.] the court shall not make an order unless doing so would be
better for the child than making no order at all. 52
While the welfare principle is not unique to this Act,53 the legislation
underscores the significance of the welfare principle in English family
47 Children Act, 1989, c. 41 (Eng.).
48 For a history of the welfare principle in England since feudal times, see KERRY
O'HALLORAN, THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD 9-35 (1999). Previous legislation on chil-
dren did exist as well, namely, the Children Act of 1948 and Children Act of 1975. It
is worth noting that the Children Act of 1989 formulated a more modem, updated
view of the family. Whereas historically, English law and policy viewed the family as a
two-parent household headed by the father, the Children Act of 1989 made no such
assumptions.
49 Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United States
and Great Britain, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 239, 245 (1992).
50 Id.
51 Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(1) (Eng.).
52 Id. § 1(2)-(5).
53 See supra note 48.
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law: The children's best interest is paramount in a court's decision,
even at the expense of other family members' rights. 54
The child's welfare is defined neither by this legislation nor by
any other. The Act's novel contribution to family law, however,
derives mostly from its introduction of a checklist of factors that
guides courts to respect the paramountcy of a child's best interest.
These include a child's needs and wishes.5- Any result of the welfare
inquiry should benefit the child the most.
The welfare principle of the Children Act of 1989 therefore
reflected common law, in addition to providing formal guidelines for
courts in their efforts to protect the children's best interests. The Act
has been a major influence on family law judges, remaining the
golden rule for child-related cases to date. 56
2. The Human Rights Act of 1998 -5 7
There are two major sources of rights for English adults: domestic
common law and European law. Domestic common law overwhelm-
54 Opining on the welfare principle, the House of Lords repeated Lord
MacDermott's sentiment, " [the welfare principle allows] a process whereby, when all
the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other
circumstances are taken into account and weighed the course to be followed will be
that which is most in the interests of the child's welfare as that term has now to be
understood. That is the first consideration because it is of first importance and the
paramount consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be fol-
lowed." In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), [1988] A.C. 806, 821
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
55 The exact checklist is as follows:
a. the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered
in the light of his age and understanding);
b. his physical, emotional and educational needs;
c. the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
d. his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court
considers relevant;
e. any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
f. how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to
whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his
needs;
g. the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceed-
ings in question.
Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(3) (Eng.).
56 See, e.g., Stephen Gilmore, Contact/Shared Residence and Child Well-Being: Research
Evidence and Its Implications for Legal Decision-Making, 20 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 344,
345 (2006) (noting that the British Government concluded that no change was
needed to the fundamental principles in the Children Act of 1989).
57 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K).
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ingly prioritizes the welfare principle over parental rights, 
buttressed
by the Children Act of 1989. European law, on the other 
hand, more
seriously considers parents' rights, particularly those created 
by the
European Convention on Human 
Rights.5 8
English courts often have opined that neither European 
law nor
European conventions have the force of law because 
of Parliamentary
sovereignty, which allows England's domestic legislation 
to take prece-
dence over any national or international law created 
by other bod-
ies.59 Thus, although the United Kingdom had ratified 
the European
Convention on Human Rights, it was unenforceable 
by the English
courts until the Human Rights Act of 1998 incorporated 
it into
English domestic law. 6
0 Prior to 1998, any Englishman wronged
under the Convention had to bring his case to the 
European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg.
61
The Human Rights Act of 1998, in bringing human 
rights home
by facilitating their enforceability in English courts, 
has been touted as
a milestone in English law and the near equivalent 
of the United
States Constitution.62 At a minimum, the Human 
Rights Act provided
England with a written, enforceable document containing 
"a compre-
hensive statement of individual, fundamental rights."
63
The introduction of such legislation into the legal 
system, how-
ever, confused the English judiciary's traditional role. One 
court
wrote, "It is now plain that the incorporation of 
the European Con-
vention on Human Rights into our domestic law will 
subject the entire
legal system to a fundamental process of review and, where 
necessary,
reform by the judiciary." 64 However, courts have exhibited noticeable
hesitancy in integrating the European Convention 
on Human
58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European 
Convention on Human
Rights].
59 See, e.g., In re C. (A Child) (H.I.V. Testing), [2000) Fain. 
48, 61.
60 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
61 See HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRAcTIcE 23 (Lord Lester 
of Herne Hill & David
Pannick eds., 2004).
62 The Human Rights Act of 1998 conveys 
certain rights that are even more gen-
erous than those provided by the U.S. Constitution. 
For a specific example of the
Act's uniquely broad understanding of a human 
right (the procreative freedom of
convicted criminals), see Elaine E. Sutherland, Procreative 
Freedom and Convicted
Criminals in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
Is Child Welfare Becoming the New
Eugenics', 82 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1042-50 (2003).
63 DAVID HOFFMAN &JOHN ROWE, HUMAN 
RiGHTS IN THE UK 17 (2003).
64 R. v. DPP, ex parte Kebilene, [2000] 2 A.C. 326, 
375 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
1663
20071 ADULT RIGHTS AS I .
Rights.6 5 This resistance to the Convention surfaced 
in family law as
well, particularly when English judges were confronted by Article 
8.66
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights has
bound the English family law courts since 1998-when 
Parliament
passed the Human Rights Act.
67 The Article provides extensive rights
to litigious adults:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.
68
Article 8 of the Convention thus prohibits governmental 
interfer-
ence with people's family rights except when all 
three of the following
conditions are met: the interference 1) is in accordance 
with the law,
2) pursues one of the aims enumerated in Article 8(2), 
and 3) is nec-
essary in a democratic society. These conditions 
were subsequently
formulated into a three prong 
test.69
The European Court of Human Rights, the international 
court
for the enforcement of the European Convention 
on Human Rights,
has had the opportunity to interpret the terms 
of Article 8 in various
cases. The Court has interpreted the phrase "in 
accordance with the
law" to mean that the impugned measures 
should have a basis in
domestic law. 70 The expression also regards the 
quality of the law in
65 See, e.g., David Bonner et al., Judicial Approaches 
to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 549, 572 (2003) (arguing that the Human Rights 
Act has been met with
suspicion from English judges).
66 See generally In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination 
of Access), [1988 A.C.
806 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding 
that the welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration and that parental 
rights, whatever those may be under the
Convention, become immediately subservient 
to it).
67 David Hoffman and John Rowe underscore 
the impact of the Convention on
England:
It will be necessary for the courts of 
the United Kingdom to consider
whether the Convention increases the rights 
of individuals who may assert a
right to be consulted about the life of the 
family or members of it. But the
Convention has a much wider effect; it will 
impose an obligation on public
authorities to take into account a family 
which may be affected by a decision.
HoFFMAN & RowE, supra note 63, at 194.
68 European Convention on Human Rights, 
supra note 58, art. 8.
69 See, e.g., Yousef v. Netherlands, 2002-VIII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 259-60.
70 L. v. Finland, App. No. 25651/94, 31 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 738 (2001).
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question, requiring accessibility and foreseeability to prevent a govern-
ment's arbitrary interference. 71
The aims enumerated in Article 8(2) include national security,
public safety, the economic health of the country, the prevention of
disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others. The European court
may classify children as "others" for the purpose of this clause, which
allows it to pay some attention to a child's rights in the process of
weighing the adults' rights.72
Finally, the expression "necessary in a democratic society"
requires that the interference "corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued; in determining whether an interference is 'necessary in a demo-
cratic society,' the Court will take into account that a margin of
appreciation is left to the Contracting States." 73
Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights has inter-
preted the fundamental right of Article 8 to be access of a family
member to children, opining, "the mutual enjoyment by parent and
child, as well as by grandparent and child, of each other's company
constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and domestic mea-
sures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the
right protected by Article 8 of the Convention."74
In sum, Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights and the
attendant European case law create equal rights to privacy for both
children and adults. These equal rights to privacy of all family mem-
bers directly conflict with the Children Act of 1989.75 This is particu-
larly true under the interpretation of Article 8 by the European Court
of Human Rights. 76 With the advent of the Human Rights Act of
71 Id.
72 See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
73 Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 32 (1989); see also W. v. United King-
dom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8, 27 (1988) (noting that governments have some discretion
in deciding which measures are "necessary in a democratic society").
74 L. v Finland, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 757-58; see, e.g., Andersson v. Sweden, 226
Eur. Ct. H.R. 6 (1992); W. v. United Kingdom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27. But cf. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion) (denying grandparents' access to
the child); A v. C, [1985] 6 Faro. L.R. 445, 451 (arguing that access to a child is an
opportunity, not a right).
75 See Shazia Choudhry & Helen Fenwick, Taking the Rights of Parents and Children
Seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle Under the Human Rights Act, 25 OxroRD J.
LEGAL STUD. 453, 457 (1998).
76 See id. at 454 ("(T]he (European] Court [of Human Rights] affords weight to
the Article 8 fights of parents to respect for family life so that in the case of a clash of
rights those of the child will not invariably win out and therefore the inception of the
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1998, all of this law became integrated into English domestic law-
laying the foundation for conflict between the rights of children and
those of adults.
3. The Ensuing Conflict Between Adults' and Children's Rights
The clash between the interests of English adults and children
therefore results from the distinct but conflicting rights endowed by
the Children Act of 1989 and the Human Rights Act of 1998. Between
these two acts, the most significant source of tension is the amount of
weight each places on the best interests of the child.77
In endowing equal rights to all family members, the Convention
on Human Rights treats children as legal equivalents of adults. Thus,
if a court wanted to prioritize the child's interests, it can only do so by
including the child as an exception to the parent's rights under Arti-
cle 8(2), which allows governmental interference in the family "for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."7 The child, in
other words, needs to become the "other" to have his rights and free-
doms protected. This exception is the only means for the European
Court to align its judgments with England's welfare principle.79 How-
ever, although identifying a child as an "other" fulfills the "legitimate
aim" prong, the interference must also be both in accordance with the
law and necessary in a democratic society. The European Court easily
and often finds a violation of one of these three prongs, enabling it to
rule in favor of a parent despite the best interests of her child. And
hence, European family law inherently conflicts with English family
law, which is complicated by the English courts' insistence on the wel-
fare principle.8°
Human Rights Act has called the current [English] domestic approach into
question.").
77 See id. at 457 ("Article 8 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], in
encapsulating the fights of both parents and children to private and family life,
appears on its face to come into clear conflict with the [Children Act of 1989], which
renders the child's interests paramount.").
78 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 8.
79 CompareYousefv. Netherlands, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 262 ("[]n judicial
decisions where the rights under Art. 8 of parents and those of a child are at stake, the
child's rights must be the paramount consideration. If any balancing of interests is
necessary, the interests of the child must prevail."), with Choudhry & Fenwick, supra
note 75, at 467 (noting that English courts rely on a narrow subset of European juris-
prudence to find in favor of children's best interests, neglecting the remainder of
European case law).
80 SeeA v. C, (1985] 6 Faro. L.R. 445, 450 ("In some cases it is said there has been
talk of access [to a child] as being the ... right way of approaching the question. I
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In Johansen v. Norway,8l for example, a mentally and physically ill
mother who entered abusive relationships with men challenged the
placement of her second child into foster care with a view toward
adoption.8 2 She argued that her Article 8 rights were violated,
prompting the European Court of Human Rights to apply the three
prong test. The Court was able to satisfy itself that the Norwegian
government's interference with the mother's Article 8 rights was legiti-
mate because it intended to safeguard the development of the child.8 3
Furthermore, the Court agreed that the interference was in accor-
dance with domestic law.8 4 However, the Court imposed strict legal
scrutiny on permanent restrictions on a parent's right of access to her
child. Permanent deprivation of an adult's rights to a child can only
be necessary under Article 8(2) if there are compelling reasons and
exceptional circumstances.8 5 According to the Court, the mother's
track record of significant instability, not to mention the problems she
encountered in raising her first child with the help of welfare authori-
ties, were not enough to deprive her of permanent access to her child
under Article 8.86
The result in Johansen is nearly inconceivable in the English legal
system, which would prioritize the welfare of the child over a parent's
right of access to the child. If a mother exhibited the same amount of
instability and incompetence in an English court, she would be unable
to access her child because the welfare principle opposes such
parenting.8 7
English law prioritizes children's rights through both a strict
adherence to the welfare principle and separate legislation. Legisla-
think the right way of approaching it is that the child's interests are paramount and
the court must do what it thinks is in the interests of the child.").
81 (No. 13), 1996-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 983.
82 . Id. at 991-96.
83 Id. at 1003.
84 Id. at 1002.
85 Id. at 1008.
86 Id. at 1007-10. It was only the second expert called in the case, at the mother's
request, that had any hope for the mother's ability to raise her child. The first expert
expressed a view in harmony with the stance of English courts, "It is of decisive impor-
tance for [the child's] personal development that she now gets the opportunity to
attach herself to persons whom she may regard during her adolescence as stable and
secure parents." Id. at 987. This expert's view was subsequently rejected by the
Human Rights Court. Id.
87 See, e.g., In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), (1988] A.C. 806,
813-20 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that a mother's access to her child,
who was placed in foster care toward the view of permanent adoption, can be
restricted if in the best interests of the child).
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tively separating children's rights from those of adults favors chil-
dren's interests in two ways. First, it allows a government to recognize
the priority of children's rights over conflicting adults' rights. Sec-
ond, children's legislation serves as a tie breaker among the litigants:
Should a conflict arise between the rights of children and those of
adults, the court can invoke the paramountcy of the welfare principle.
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the English courts have
been completely averse to adult interests. However, adult interests
were considered privileges instead of rights. As Shazia Fenwick and
Helen Choudhry explain, "In the pre-[Human Rights Act of 1998
era], then, it is clear that while the parents' interests were not
ignored, and might be viewed as privileges, they were not character-
ized as rights and the paramountcy principle was the determining fac-
tor."88 Furthermore, according to one scholar,8 9 courts were mindful
of adult interests much before the Human Rights Act of 1998, guard-
ing them through various other means, such as loosely enforcing the
welfare principle, artificially aligning the interests of children and
their parents,90 and outright denying jurisdiction to avoid messy fam-
ily law issues.91 Following the Human Rights Act, however, English
courts must consider adults' interests as rights instead of privileges-
an uncomfortable proposition.
This means, of course, that English adults in child-related cases
can invoke certain protections under the Human Rights Act to
counter the welfare principle, giving rise to the present conflict. One
commentator succinctly paraphrased the resulting task for English
courts, "But in the light of the Human Rights Act and the centrality of
88 Choudhry & Fenwick, supra note 75, at 462; see also A v. C, [1985] 6 Fain. L.R.
445, 451 ("As I understand it, the law is that, prima facie, the parents shall have access
to his or her child and that that shall be unless there is very good reason to the
contrary. It is not a right, it is a privilege. It is always up to the judge to decide what is
the best interests of the child." (emphasis added)).
89 Jonathan Herring, The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle in Family
Law-Conflicting or Complementary?, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 133
(Frances Butler ed., 2000).
90 In re T. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242. The
court decided not to force life-saving medical treatment on a child whose parents
resisted the treatment, reasoning, "this mother and this child are one for the purpose
of this unusual case and the decision of the court to consent to the operation jointly
affects the mother and son and it also affects the father." Id. at 251.
91 Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions), [1997] 2 Fain. L.R. 638, 643
(C.A.) (denying the court's jurisdiction in a case where a mother's relocation was
contested because she merely wanted to relocate within the U.K.). But cf Payne v.
Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 166, [2001] Fain. 473, [2]-[26] (allowing a mother to
emigrate with her child from England to New Zealand over the objections of the
child's father, who lived in England).
2007]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the welfare principle in the Children Act, the courts are going to be
forced to develop some kind of synthesis between the two approaches
if at all possible."92
B. Judicial Attempts at Resolving the Conflict in England
Having been entrusted with the delicate task of integrating Arti-
cle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights with the welfare
principle, English judges have slowly begun adjudicating cases within
the new legal framework. The best way to classify the courts' reaction
to Article 8, however, is awkward resistance, particularly when it comes
to compromising the welfare principle. 93
The courts have not yet justified their continued departure from
the Convention that binds them. Despite attempting several reconcili-
ations of Article 8 with the welfare principle, no clear resolution has
emerged. Instead, the courts have used several methods of entirely
avoiding the invariable problems posed to adults' Article 8 rights by
the welfare principle.
1. Denying the Existence of a Conflict
One strategy the English courts have adopted toward the conflict
is to deny its existence.9 4 To this end, the House of Lords has often
either narrowly interpreted the Convention so that it overlaps with
English law, or broadened its interpretation to the point that it speaks
of universal truths.95 Either way, the conflict between Article 8 and
92 Herring, supra note 89, at 135.
93 See generally Choudhry & Fenwick, supra note 75, at 462-69 (arguing that
English courts have resisted the Human Rights Acts because courts are too attached
to the welfare principle as currently conceived-that children's welfare automatically
prevails over the rights of other family members).
94 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 has imposed on English courts an
obligation to interpret any British legislation as compatible with Convention Rights,
or else declare an incompatibility so that legislators can remedy it. See Lady Justice
Arden, The Interpretation of UK Domestic Legislation in the Light of European Convention on
Human Rights Jurisprudence, 25 STATUTE L. REv. 165, 166 (2004). However, there is a
significant difference between favorably viewing English legislation as compatible with
Article 8 and turning a blind eye to conflict in lieu of declaring an incompatibility. By
declaring an incompatibility, English courts would compel Parliament to remedy the
conflict between Article 8 and the welfare principle, perhaps by legislatively weaken-
ing the Children Act of 1989. Such a result is unacceptable to English judges who
have long prioritized the welfare principle over adults' rights. For the proposition
that English family law courts have been hostile to the Human Rights Act of 1998
from its beginning, see Bonner et al., supra note 65, at 572.
95 See, e.g., Re C (A Child) (Immunisation: Parental Rights), [2003] EWCA (Civ)
1148, [24], (771-[80] (focusing so narrowly on Article 8 that the case's discussion of
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the welfare principle artificially disappears because the differences
between them are wholly avoided.
Two judicial opinions in In re K.D.96 exemplify both the narrow
and broad interpretations of the Convention that English courts have
embraced in their efforts to minimize the conflict between Article 8
and the welfare principle. Although the case was heard well before
the Convention's integration into English law, it is significant because
the House of Lords tried to reconcile Article 8 with English common
law, mostly by denying the conflicts between the two legal systems.
Lord Templeman began his opinion by focusing on the subset of
principles from English common law and the Convention that over-
lapped, as well as rehearsing their similar histories. 97 He narrowed his
interpretation of each to the point that any conflict between the two
legal systems was circumvented:
My Lords, English common law and statute require that in all mat-
ters concerning the upbringing'of an infant the welfare of the child
shall be the first and paramount consideration.... The English rule
was evolved against an historical background of conflict between
parents over the upbringing of their children. The [European]
Convention [on Human Rights] rule was evolved against an histori-
cal background of claims by the state to control the private lives of
individuals. Since the last war interference by public authorities
with families for the protection of children has greatly increased in
this country. In my opinion there is no inconsistency of principle or
application between the English rule and the Convention rule. The
best person to bring up a child is the natural parent.95
From this narrow interpretation of Article 8, Lord Templeman
extracted the proposition that a biological parent is the best person to
raise a child. This is indeed true of English common law as well. 99
The problem, however, with using this singular similarity to reconcile
English common law with Article 8 is that it does not address the most
litigated issues where the welfare principle and Article 8 diverge. It is
practically inconceivable to imagine a jurisdiction that keeps children
away from their fit, biological parents. But, what happens if the par-
the medical condition of tetanus is longer and more extensive than its analysis of
Article 8).
96 In re KD. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), (1988] A.C. 806 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
97 Id. at 811.
98 Id. at 811-12.
99 Section 1 of the Children Act of 1989 provides guiding principles for English
courts, one of which prevents them from entering an order unless doing so is better
for the child than not. Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(5) (Eng.); see supra text accom-
panying note 52.
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ents are unfit? Furthermore, how should a court handle a case
wherein one parent wants to emigrate with a child over the objections
of the other parent? It is on these issues that Article 8 and English
common law diverge, creating conflicts that Lord Templeman
neglected by invoking a common but misrepresentative subset of the
two legal systems.
In the same case, another judge in the House of Lords, Lord Oli-
ver of Aylmerton, also attempted to reconcile Article 8 with common
law, but by generalizing both legal systems to the point of discussing
universal truths. He opined:
Such conflict [between Article 8 and English law] as exists, is, I
think, semantic only and lies only in differing ways of giving expres-
sion to the single common concept that the natural bond and rela-
tionship between parent and child gives rise to universally
recognized norms which ought not to be gratuitously interfered
with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the
welfare of the child dictates it.1°0
Although Lord Oliver's argument is similar to Lord Tem-
pleman's, he managed to broaden the interpretation of the Conven-
tion in order to reach a universal truth that is undeniable:
Governments should not interfere with universally recognized norms.
However, Lord Oliver proceeds further with his argument to suggest
that such interference may be legitimate if in the best interests of the
child.10 1 Although this last argument perfectly suits English common
law and the Children Act of 1989, it ignores the equality of rights
granted to all family members by Article 8.
Even though both Lord Templeman and Lord Oliver proclaim
the similarities between European and English law in In re K.D., the
case probably would have been decided much differently by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, illustrating the conflict between English
common law and Article 8. Because In re K.D. was decided prior to
the Human Rights Act, however, only the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg could have vindicated the mother's Article 8
rights-an opportunity she failed to pursue.10 2 If the subsequent case
of Johansen is any indicator, though, the European Court would have
likely opposed the English court.10 3 The facts were similar in both
cases-centering on an incompetent mother whose access to her
100 In re K.D., [19983 A.C. at 825.
101 Id.
102 In re K.D. illustrates the reasoning behind the Human Rights Act of 1998-
poor litigants could not afford to take their case to Strasbourg, so their Convention
fights had to be enforceable in English courts so as to be truly protected.
103 SeeJohansen v. Norway, (No. 13), 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 983.
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child was threatened by adoption, which would have 
been in the
child's best interests. However, the European Court 
of Human Rights
prohibited any restrictions on the incompetent mother's 
rights to her
child in Johansen, a result to the contrary of the 
one reached by the
English court in In re KD.
104
Both the narrowing and broadening of the interpretation 
of the
Convention thus misses the point of Article 8 and 
glosses over the
details that conflict with English law-significant 
details that create
the grounds on which cases in each jurisdiction are decided.
Whatever similarities the English courts cite, then, 
cannot be repre-
sentative of a harmony between Article 8 and the welfare 
principle,
which inherently diverge on central issues.
2. Misapplying European Law
To deny that the Human Rights Act and the Children 
Act entitle
children and adults to conflicting rights is either 
to avoid the Conven-
tion or to misunderstand it. Given the European 
Court's extensive
explanations and interpretations of Article 8,105 
the resulting implica-
tion is that the English courts are deliberately 
avoiding the conse-
quences of the Convention on the welfare principle.
Payne v. Payne06 provides an example of the 
English courts'
reformulation of European law to find in the 
best interests of the
child. In Payne, a child's mother was allowed 
to permanently move
with her child to New Zealand from England, 
despite the father's
argument that decreasing contact with their 
child would infringe his
Article 8 rights. The court reasoned that the 
relocation would make
the mother happier, thereby increasing 
the welfare of her child.
1 0 7
The English court in Payne dismissed the father's 
Article 8 claim
by selectively quoting the decision of the European 
Court of Human
Rights in Johansen to argue that the European 
Court shared England's
preoccupation with the welfare principle.
10 In Payne, the English
Court of Appeals opined: "Accordingly the jurisprudence of 
the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights inevitably recognises 
the paramountcy
104 Id. at 1010.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
106 Payne v. Payne, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 166, [20011 Fain. 
473. For an excellent
discussion regarding the sloppiness of Paynes 
treatment of Convention law, see Bon-
ner et al., supra note 65, at 549.
107 Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 166 at [301 ("Logically 
and as a matter of experi-
ence the child cannot draw emotional and psychological 
security and stability from
the dependency unless the primary carer herself 
is emotionally and psychologically
stable and secure. The parent cannot give what 
she herself lacks.").
108 Id. at [39]; see infra note 112. But see supra Part II.A.2.
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principle, albeit not expressed in the language 
of our domestic stat-
ute."109 It concluded so because, "In Johansen, the court held 
that:
'the court will attach particular importance to the best 
interests of the
child, which... may override those of the parent."'
110 As one scholar
underscored, however, the exact language of Johansen 
conveys an
entirely, different sentiment: "'[T] he court will attach 
particular
importance to the best interests of the child, which, 
depending on their
nature and seriousness, may override those of the 
parent."'"" 1 The
English court's intentional omission of a vital phrase 
in Johansen dis-
torts the message of the European Court, which 
only prioritizes the
best interests of a child in certain, undefined circumstances.
1 1 2 Oth-
erwise, according to Article 8, the right to family 
privacy is shared
equally by children and adults, without any priority 
given to children's
best interests.
Furthermore, the Payne court made an unwarranted 
distinction
between families fragmented by divorce and traditional 
ones, a dis-
tinction that simply does not exist in the case law 
interpreting Article
8 of the European Convention.
113 When it came to the traditional
family, Payne suggested that English law and European 
law were well
aligned because "[i]n a united family the right to family 
life is a
shared right."11 4 However, according to Payne, 
there was a void in
European law that English law completed in regard 
to fragmented
family life, "But once a family unit disintegrates the 
separating mem-
bers' separate rights can only be to a fragmented 
family life. Certainly
the absent parent has the right to participation 
to the extent and in
what manner the complex circumstances of 
the individual case dic-
tate." ' 1 5 And thus, Payne concluded that the 
Convention did not
impact English domestic law and should not 
alter its course, which
109 Payne, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 166 at [381.
110 Id. at [39] (citations omitted) (quotingJohansen v. 
Norway, 1996-111 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 1008).
111 Choudhry & Fenwick, supra note 75, at 463 
(quoting Johansen, 1996-111 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 1008). But see Yousef v. Netherlands, 2002-VIII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 261-62
(allowing a child's interest to weigh more heavily in the 
balancing approach).
112 The argument frequently used by the 
English courts-that the European
Court similarly respects the best interests standard-is 
based on a very selective subset
of European jurisprudence, which nonetheless requires a 
serious consideration of
adults' rights. See Choudhry & Fenwick, supra 
note 75, at 467.
113 Payne, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 166 at [351.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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prioritizes the child's welfare in adjudicating fragmented family mem-
bers' rights. 116
Article 8, however, makes no such distinction between 
frag-
mented and traditional families. Article 8 leaves 
no void for English
law to fill in cases involving fragmented families-it 
applies equally to
all family members, without any preference to children's 
best inter-
ests. Furthermore, the European Court has interpreted 
a parent's or
grandparent's access to his children as constituting 
the fundamental
element to the protection of family.
1 1 7 Permanently depriving a
father of access to his child without compelling 
reasons is subject to
strict scrutiny according to the European Court 
of Human Rights.118
Thus, Payne's interpretation of Article 8 as excluding 
fragmented fam-
ily members is pure legal fiction.
Finally, the Payne court blatantly refused to compromise 
English
precedent that conflicted with Article 8 when 
the father challenged
the result stemming from the English case Poel v. 
Poe, 1 9 which formu-
lated a test permitting one parent to emigrate with 
a child when rea-
sonable.1 20 Although a reasonableness test 
would not satisfy the
European Court's strict scrutiny for cases that 
deprive one parent of
access to his child, 121 the Payne court diverged 
even further from
European case law by stating that the fundamental 
question in the
case actually regarded the best interests of the 
child.1 22 The judge
concluded that a happy mother would benefit 
the child and, "[i] t is
true that it means cutting the child off to a 
large extent-almost
wholly perhaps-from the father; but that is 
one of the risks which
have to be run in cases of this kind.
12 3
Thus, Paynes selective and misleading quotation 
of European
law, in addition to its blatant denial of any conflict 
between Article 8
and English law, underscores English courts' resistance 
to Article 8
and illustrates their methods of avoiding any 
potential conflict with
the welfare principle.
116 The court opined that "each member of 
the fractured family has rights to
assert and that in balancing them the court must 
adhere to the paramountcy of the
welfare principle." Id. at [37].
117 See supra text accompanying note 74.
118 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying 
text.
119 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1469 (C.A.).
120 Id. at 1473-74.
121 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying 
text.
122 Payne v. Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 166, [2001] Fam. 
473, [16], [39].
123 Id. at [18] (quoting A v. A (Child: Removal from Jurisdiction), 
[1980] 1 Fam.
L.R. 380, 381-82 (C.A. 1979)).
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III. LESSONS FROM ENGLAND
Having abided by the paramountcy of the welfare 
principle for
centuries, only within the last ten years have 
English courts faced
adults armed with explicit individual rights from 
across the Channel.
It is unsurprising, then, that the reaction of English 
courts to forced
prioritization of adult rights has been peppered 
with resistance.
The development of the conflict between adults' 
rights and chil-
dren's best interests in England has paralleled 
the problems resulting
from the federalization of family law in the 
United States as the
Supreme Court opened its docket to abortion, 
adoption, and child
custody issues. As Troxel and Palmore illustrate, 
Americans may rely on
due process and equal protection arguments to 
curtail the reach of
the best interests standard. However, before the 
best interests stan-
dard becomes a vestigial organ of a formerly 
state-controlled issue,
England's experience offers several ominous warnings 
for the Ameri-
can family law system.
A. The Case Against the Federalization of American Family Law
Perhaps the most significant lesson from the 
friction between
English domestic law and European law warns 
against American feder-
alization of family law, particularly in regards to 
cases involving chil-
dren. Not only would the best interests standard 
be weakened, but
states may also exhibit England's determination 
to resist prioritizing
adults' rights.
This possibility exists because the similarities between 
the trends
on both sides of the Atlantic permit such an 
analogy: A mandatory
legal system is setting precedence for the lower 
courts to ensure that
adults' rights be taken more seriously. Although 
England's legal sys-
tem has always prioritized children's welfare, European 
law has unsuc-
cessfully attempted to diminish the importance 
of the welfare
principle in England by reducing it to a mere factor 
in the balance of
family members' rights. Similarly, American 
federal law attempts to
dilute the best interests standard on the state level, 
thus recreating the
effect of European law on English family law.
Just as the European Court of Human Rights 
is sympathetic to
children's rights, the Supreme Court theoretically 
accepts the princi-
ple on which state family law operates in cases 
involving children-
that the children's welfare should be prioritized. 
In practice, how-
ever, the Supreme Court cannot resist entertaining 
and occasionally
legitimizing constitutional arguments regarding 
adults' rights in cases
of conflict with the children's best interests standard. 
By doing so, the
[VOL. 82:4
.... r,.^ .,l lAW REVIEW
ADULT RIGHTS AS THE ACHILLES' HEEL
states' best interests standard has been compromised by federal law, as
it has been in England by European law.
In addition to weakening the best interests standard, federal law
strengthening adults' constitutional rights under the guise of due pro-
cess and equal protection will probably encounter resistance from
lower courts. While states are bound by adults' constitutional rights,
as England is bound by Article 8 of the European Convention, they
are likely to follow England's path of resistance. Following the
Supreme Court decision in Troxel, for example, the states scrambled
to reformulate grandparents' visitation statutes to protect the best
interests of children when such interests depended on access to
grandparents. 124 New Jersey was representative of other states when
its Supreme Court continued to uphold grandparent visitation by
altering the original statute slightly:
We hold that grandparents seeking visitation under the statute must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the visita-
tion they seek would result in harm to the child. That burden is
constitutionally required to safeguard the due process rights of fit
parents. Finally, we hold that, in this case, the grandparents have
met that burden.12 5
The court then granted visitation to the grandparents post- Troxel, who
were very involved in the children's lives before the dispute arose.
These facts could not be distinguished enough from Troxel to suggest
that the states were significantly impacted by the Supreme Court
case. 
126
Thus, if England is to serve as a guide, the American Supreme
Court should be wary of federalizing family law regarding children,
particularly when doing so implicates the best interests standard.
B. Equal Treatment of Adults and Children Under the Constitution
In the United States, it is not uncommon to argue that children's
constitutional rights may sufficiently protect their interests.12 7 In
124 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN § 30-5-2
(West Supp. 2006).
125 Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 205 (N.J. 2003).
126 Both cases involved a couple with two children, whose relationships with their
grandparents were compromised by one parent's death. The remaining parent had
developed a hostile relationship with the grandparents, causing the severance of the
grandparents' intimate relationship with the children despite the best interests stan-
dard, which indicated that maintaining the relationship would be beneficial. Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-63 (2000) (plurality opinion); Moriarty, 827 A.2d at 203.
127 See, e.g., Sec'y of Pub. Welfare of Pa. v. InstitutionalizedJuveniles, 442 U.S. 640,
652 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Pennsylvania
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Troxel, Justice Scalia suggested a potential First Amendment right of
association or free exercise on behalf of the children, allowing them
to visit with their grandparents against the mother's wishes. 128 In
another Supreme Court case, it was argued on behalf of a child, albeit
unsuccessfully, that a restriction on her right to access a presumed
parent violated both her due process and equal protection rights.12 9
However, granting children constitutional fights equivalent to
those of adults in order to protect their interests in lieu of the best
interests standard is ineffective. Families finding themselves in court
are already fragmented-treating each member equally under the
Constitution is slow to resolve any issues, let alone to result in ajudg-
ment favorable to the child's best interests. This observation emerges
as the primary lesson from the European Court of Human Rights,
which frequently finds against children's traditional best interests by
endowing them with rights equal to those of adults under Article 8.
England, on the contrary, has always decided in the best interests of
the children by virtue of having separate legislation protecting them,
which forces the courts to consider the children first in adjudicating
family law cases.
As Lord Oliver of Aylmerton observed in the English case In re
KD., rarely does adjudicating an adult's rights have a neutral effect on
the child:
My Lords, if it is possible to envisage a case in the real world in
which there is such a perfect equilibrium that the effect of access by
a parent on a child of full mental capacity and in a normal state of
health can be truly said to be absolutely neutral, I can see an argu-
ment for saying that the natural bond between parent and child
may dictate a resumption or continuation of access. But that is not,
must assign each institutionalized child a representative obliged to initiate contact
with the child and ensure that the child's constitutional rights are fully protected.
Otherwise, it is inevitable that the children's due process rights will be lost through
inadvertence, inaction, or incapacity.").
128 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 n.2 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 591 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Even with respect to the First Amendment, the
rights of children have not been regarded as 'co-extensive with those of adults.'"
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring))).
129 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting the argument that a child's liberty interest in maintaining a filial relation-
ship with her natural father and her equal protection right to rebut the presumption
of her legitimacy were violated by the lower courts).
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in my judgment, this case nor is it any case that I can reasonably
envisage.' 0
If, then, adjudicating an adult's rights indeed impacts a child's 
best
interests, those best interests must be afforded 
extra protection in
determining the adult's rights-at least in a jurisdiction that adheres
to the welfare principle, such as the United States. 
Without this
added protection of the welfare principle, children's 
interests become
just one factor in a balancing act that will likely fail to protect 
the
child.
Thus, granting equal rights to adults and children 
in the United
States would weaken the best interests standard 
and lead to the
problems encountered by the English legal system 
after the adoption
of the Human Rights Act. If there is any attachment 
to the welfare
principle in a society, children must specially be 
protected in separate
legislation on the state level, or at least by strict faithfulness 
to the best
interests standard.
CONCLUSION
While the familiar conflict between adults' rights 
and children's
best interests has slowly been intensifying in the 
United States on the
heels of the federalization of family law, it has 
recently exploded in
England following the passage of conflicting 
legislation. The adult
rights enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights were
immediately met with reluctance from English 
judges when children's
best interests, prioritized by the Children 
Act of 1989, were
threatened. The English courts have continued to 
exhibit fierce loy-
alty to the children's welfare principle, either 
by denying any conflict
with European law or mischaracterizing the Convention 
by which they
are bound. This resistance, coupled with the 
visibility of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of England's experience, 
offers several lessons
for the United States.
Most importantly, this Note has argued that federal 
courts should
be wary of granting and expanding constitutional 
relief for adults in
child-related cases. Not only is the best interests 
standard compro-
mised by this, but states' enthusiasm for the standard 
will doubtfully
wane. Furthermore, the courts should be cautious 
in relying on the
Constitution to protect children's interests, which 
would be analogous
to treating children as the legal equivalents of 
adults under Article 8
of the European Convention. Judgments of the 
European Court have
130 In re KD. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), 
[19881 A.C. 806, 820
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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greatly differed from those of English and American courts because of
the European Court's inability to openly favor children's interests
without the aid of explicit support from the Convention. Therefore, if
the states remain committed to the best interests of the child, then the
most effective way to achieve protection of those interests is to explic-
itly accept the paramountcy of the standard. Moreover, federal courts
must not counter this effort by constitutionalizing child-related family
law. Fortunately, before federal courts continue dipping their prover-
bial feet into the choppy waters of family law, lessons from across the
pond can help prevent a hurricane in the field of American family
law.
